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FINDERS AND FINDERS' FEES
By ROBERT E. BENSON*
Finders have long played an integral role in the world of com-

merce but only recently has a body of common law been developed
to deal with their activities. This is due in part to the peculiar nature
of a finder's business and in part to the reluctance of courts to depart
from traditional legal concepts that "almost" fit the legal problems
raised in finders' cases.
In his article, Mr. Benson describes the normal operations of a
finder, compares finders to brokers and agents, and analyzes the
finder's operations in hopes of determining appropriate legal principles. The case of Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts, 162 Colo.
149, 425 P.2d 282 (1967) is used to illustratea typical factual situation
in finders' cases and to provide a basis for the legal analysis presented
in the paper. The author concludes by presenting the key elements in
any case involving a claim by a finder for his fee.
INTRODUCTION

HILE finders are as old as commerce, it is only in recent years
W
V
that finders have assumed an acknowledged position in the
entrepreneurial world, and with it, a developing status in the common
law. Early cases involving finders often used the terms finder, broker,
and agent interchangeably,' and the confusion is understandable since
their functions, modes of operation, and rights to compensation are
very similar.' More recently, however, courts have recognized that the
traditional rules of law relating to brokers and agents are not always
adequate to define the rights, duties, and responsibilities of a finder.3
Consequently, today's decisions reflect a tailoring of the traditional
legal principles to fit the unique role of the finder in modern business
life.
This article will first examine the nature of a finder and then
review the case of Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts,4 a finders'
fee case that provides an excellent illustration of the developing factual
and legal framework within which the finder works. Thereafter, the
*Associate, Holland & Hart, B.A. University of Iowa, 1962; LL.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1965.
1 Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts, 162 Colo. 149, 157, 425 P.2d 282, 286 (1967).
2 COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117-1-2 (1963) defines broker as "any person, firm, partnership, association, or corporation who, in consideration of compensation by fee, commission, salary, or any thing of value, or with the intention of receiving or collecting such
compensation, engages in or offers or attempts to engage in either directly or indirectly
by a continuing course of conduct or by any single act or transaction, any of the following
acts ...."
3 As is always the case, when a new subject category of common law develops, the rules
of analogous areas are borrowed. Thus, in many ways a finder is a "broker" within the
customary legal structure, and these broker principles are borrowed to start the legal
structuring of the "finder."
4 162 Colo. 149, 425 P.2d 282 (1967).
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specific problems of the finder's legal position will be considered;
namely, the elements of a finder's cause of action and the measure of
recovery to which a finder is entitled.
I. DEFINITION OF A FINDER

Probably everyone from time to time is a finder, whether the
"find" be a bargain at the local department store or a hot tip for investments. The finder with which this article is concerned, however, is
the professional finder, the man who finds and reveals information of
business opportunities for a fee- e.g., he who finds businesses available for purchase or sale; prospective buyers or sellers of goods; and
available financing, investments, and employment.5 Finders are also
active in connection with corporate mergers and securities underwriting,
many men devoting their full time to finding employment opportunities
for underwriters and underwriters for companies seeking to issue stock.'
In addition, finders are often engaged in seeking funds which are available for purchasing securities issues.
The role and efforts of a finder may vary dramatically according
to the needs and wishes of the parties with whom he is dealing and the
type of opportunities with which he is familiar. As a result, the description of a finder's functions and the legal principles applicable
thereto have varied considerably. In Seckendorff v. Halsey, Stuart &
Co.,' the court apparently felt that finders play a very limited role with
minimal duties:
Plaintiff was in nowise a broker.... He was merely a finder of this
piece of business. He was to receive his compensation for finding the
business and bringing the same to the attention of Rogers, Caldwell
& Co. and its associates. He claimed his compensation solely on the
ground that he was the originator of the business and had disclosed
to Rogers, Caldwell & Co. and its associates the opportunity to engage
in its financing.8

And in Baldwin v. Grymes,9 the court also saw a limited role for the
finder but recognized that his services might consist of something more
than merely revealing an opportunity: "A 'finder,' it has been said, is
one who finds, interests, introduces and brings together parties for
5See, e.g., Lindeman v. Textron, Inc., 229 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1956) (presenting the
advantageous purchase of one textile company to another); Weinreb v. Strauss, 80 A.2d
47 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1951) (finding a retail liquor store for sale); Garrett v.Wall,
29 Ga. App. 642, 116 S.E. 331 (1923) (finding and introducing prospective purchaser
of saw mill timber); Miller & Demton v. Batten, 247 Ky. 339, 57 S.W.2d 33 (1933)
(introducing a prospective purchaser of an oil and gas lease).
6
An illuminating description of the role of finders in the securities field is set forth in
C. ISRAELS & G. DUFF, WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC 36-40 (1962).
7234 App. Div. 61, 254 N.Y.S. 250 (1931), rev'd on other grounds, 250 N.Y. 353.
182 N.E. 14 (1932).
81d., 254 N.Y.S. at 260.
9 232 Md. 470, 194 A.2d 285 (1963).
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a deal, even though he has no part in negotiating the terms of the trans0
action."1
On the basis of the language in Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v.
Roberts," the finder's duties, at least in the oil and gas industry, may
be more substantial:
The usual type of broker's commission case in the regulated real estate
business in Colorado, as is urged by the defendant, is not necessarily
in point here. For example, oil and gas brokers do not evaluate the
properties, nor do they necessarily enter into the negotiations or consummate the transactions, i.e., handle the dosing. Such brokers' or
finders' principal activities and services are to locate a property or lease,
bring it to the attention of a prospective buyer and thereafter to obtain
the requested data if possible. He is then only paid
a commission if
2
the property is actually acquired by his prospect.'
From the above cases it is apparent that the appropriate definition
of a finder is often a factual question and that the only description that
would include all those properly considered to be finders might simply
be one who "finds, introduces, and brings together parties to a business
opportunity . ..,8'. Any more extensive definition of a finder's role,
the conditions as to his compensation, or the opportunities with which
he deals would inevitably be honored only in its exceptions.
Having briefly examined the nature of a finder's activities, a comparison of finders to brokers and agents is necessary to further clarify
a finder's role and the legal principles applicable thereto. Depending
upon the services a finder undertakes to perform and his relationship
to his "buyer", he may act as an agent or as a broker. When he is
engaged by another to locate a specific type of opportunity, he functions
much like an agent and the law of agency may be determinative of his
duties, rights, and obligations. 1 4 For example, the finder would have
the customary responsibilities of loyalty and good faith to his principal,' 5 and he could neither deal in the agency matter for his own
benefit without the knowing consent of his principal,'" nor could he
act adversely to the interests of his principal by serving or acquiring
any private interest of his own in antagonism or opposition thereto.' 7
Further, he would be required to account to his principal for any secret
'lid.

at 472, 194 A.2d at 287.

11162 Colo. 149, 425 P.2d 282 (1967).
121d. at 157, 425 P.2d at 286.
13Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 1160, 1164 (1969).
14 Because a finder seldom acts as an agent and because his duties are not totally consistent
with most agents' duties, he would probably be considered a slightly peculiar type of
agent, but the general laws of agency would still apply.
15 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 387-98 (1957). The determination of the existence of an agency capacity of a finder generally would be no different
than any other agent.
6
1d. § 389.
171d. § 387.
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profit he may have realized in the course of his agency, even though
the principal has suffered no loss.'
It is also true that as an agent, a finder cannot act for both parties
to the opportunity, unless both parties consent at least as to matters
involving the exercise of discretion.1 9 Indeed, if the agent does so act,
principal has a right to all compensation received by the agent from
the other party; 20 has no obligation to compensate the agent; 2 ' and
may even have the right to avoid the transaction. However, if the
double agency is known to both principals, there is no violation of
22
duty.
When a finder learns of an opportunity independently and then
seeks out persons who might be interested in such an opportunity, he
acts not as an agent but as a broker. In such capacity he may introduce
parties, assemble information, and assist in negotiations but cannot
attempt to serve the particular interest of either side. His efforts are
directed toward consummation of the transaction," and to this end he
assists either party. In these circumstances, the finder has no obligation
of loyalty or duty to either party. 24 Similarly, he may receive a fee from
both parties to the proposed transaction.
While the above discussion might suggest that a finder is a broker
when acting independently, a finder can be distinguished from a broker
by the limited subject matter of a broker's activities, the minimal duties
of a finder, and the informality of the agreement between a finder and
and the parties to the underlying transaction or opportunity. The Consolidated Oil case makes this distinction clearer and also suggests some
of the problems which arise in finders' cases.
II. ConsolidatedOil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts
Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts 25 involved a somewhat
typical finder situation, wherein the plaintiff sought compensation for
disclosing a business opportunity to the defendant. While the court
was somewhat ambiguous in its determination of the legal status of
18 Id. §§

388, 403.

19 Id. §§ 391, 392, 394.

2oId. § 388.
21 Cf. Whittenberg v. Carnegie, 328 Mich. 125, 42 N.W.2d 900 (1950); McMichael v.
Burnett, 136 Kan. 654, 17 P.2d 932 (1933).

2 Cf. Fitzsimons v. Southern Exp. Co., 40 Ga. 330 (1869); Brockman v. Delta Mfg. Co.,
184 Okla. 357, 87 P.2d 968

(1939); Rice v. Davis, 136 Pa. 439, 20 A. 513 (1890).

23 The fact that the finder performs services may be relevant to our earlier considerations.
First, it may indicate an implied assent that he is required to perform other services in
order to be entitled to compensation. Second, particularly if the services aid the party
from whom no compensation is sought, services may indicate an implied acknowledgment
that consummation of the transaction is a condition to the finder's right to compensation.
24 Except perhaps to not reveal the opportunity to others while the parties are negotiating.

2 162 Colo. 149, 425 P.2d 282 (1967).
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the finder and his right to compensation, its opinion nevertheless touches
upon or suggests the broad spectrum of problems of the legal status,
rights, and obligations of a finder.
The facts, in brief, were as follows: Plaintiff Roberts was a broker
in the oil and gas business and in this capacity learned that defendant
Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. was interested in acquiring companies in
the oil and gas business. In August of 1959, Roberts advised the officers
of Consolidated of an oil company with whom Consolidated might
merge, although he did not reveal the name of the company at that
time. At Consolidated's request, Roberts submitted pertinent engineering
data on the company and then informed Consolidated that the name
of the prospect was Midland Oil Co. Consolidated did not ask Roberts
to perform any further acts in connection with the transaction.
In the fall of 1960, approximately one year after Roberts disclosed the name of the company to Consolidated, the two companies
merged on basically the same terms that had been proposed when
Roberts first advised Consolidated of the opportunity. Roberts requested
from Consolidated a reasonable "finder's fee" for his services in connection with the merger and commenced an action when his request
was refused.
The court held that Roberts was entitled to recover on an implied
contract basis, 26 since there was no express agreement between the
parties and since the amount of compensation had not otherwise been
agreed upon. The court was not overly specific as to the particular type
of implied contract 27 which it determined had existed between Roberts
and Consolidated, but it set out the following elements as essential
to establishing the claim:
The circumstances from which such a contract may be implied seem
to be two; first, that the broker or agent has rendered services, and

is permitted to do so in such a manner as to indicate that he expected
to be paid for these services; and second, that the services are beneficial
28
to the party sought to be made liable.

Recognizing the duty to render services in order to be compensated, the
court was faced with the issue of how much or what quantum of
services to require. To this it was said:
The measure of performance of an oil and gas broker or finder would
seem to require only that he present a property available for acquisition
and then procure any requested information needed to evaluate the
28

1d. at 156, 425 P.2d

at

286.

27 See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

§ 5 (1933); Comment "a" refers to an express contract as being one the terms and existence of which are expressed verbally or in writing,
an implied contract as one the terms and existence of which are expressed by the actions
of the parties, and quasi contract as not being based upon apparent intention of the
parties but created by law for reasons of justice. The latter two types of contracts are
both implied but are based on different considerations!
28Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts, 162 Colo. 149, 156-57, 425 P.2d 282, 286

(1967).
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property. His compensation is dependent upon the subsequent purchase,

but not upon his efforts toward accomplishing the purchase. 29
The last sentence makes it clear that the right to compensation is not
dependent upon the quantum of services rendered, once the minimum
requirement of making the opportunity available and providing requested information is met. It is also significant that this was only a
finding of fact based upon evidence of the custom of the oil and gas
industry30 and presumably did not establish as a matter of law the
amount of services required to be performed by finders in all instances,
or even within the oil and gas industry itself.3
Even though the court only set out a minimum service requirement,
it did add that for Roberts to be entitled to compensation there had to
be a continuing connection between his services and the merger. To
this point, citing cases involving claims for real estate broker's commissions, Consolidated asserted that Roberts did not prove that he was
the "efficient agent" or "procuring cause" of the transaction.3 2 The
court rejected the argument that those requirements that are generally
applicable to recovery of a real estate broker's fee applied to finder's
cases. It said:
[Those] [c]ases . . . relied on by the defendant, are not applicable

here, for this is not the type of transaction where a broker, at the
initial contact, produces a ready, willing and able buyer who purchases
the property, upon the terms and at a price then designated by the

principal. Those cases though do stand for the proposition, which is
applicable here, that the broker must be the efficient agent or procuring
cause of the sale ...
We discussed the rights of a so-called "finder" in George v.
Dower, 125 Colo. 45, 55, 62, 240 P.2d 897 (1952) to the effect that he

who is entitled to the commission is the one who sets the chain of
33
events in motion which result in the sale.

The term "procuring cause" suggests a primary or principal cause, but
the court's explanation of this phrase-that a finder must set the
"chain of events in motion which result in the sale" - suggests a
lesser contribution by the finder. Again, the court was not clear but

apparently felt that since Roberts had performed all the customary
services required in the oil and gas industry, the services had suffi29
30

1d. at 158, 425 P.2d at 287.
Custom of the industry is normally implied into every contract, and a fortiori, into every
quantum meruit relation. See A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 631, 632, 653, 654 (1960);

S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 887(A), 887(AA) (3d ed. 1962).
31At some point custom may be judicially noticed, perhaps once a higher court has

recognized the custom of an industry. Ultimately, requirements based upon custom may
become statements of law.
3
2Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts, 162 Colo. 149, 151, 425 P.2d 282, 286 (1967).
Heady v. Tomlinson, 134 Colo. 33, 299 P.2d 120 (1956) and Babcock v. Merritt, 1
Colo. App. 84, 27 P. 882 (1891) were the cases relied on by Consolidated.
33 Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts, 162 Colo. 149, 157-58, 425 P.2d 282, 286
(1967).
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ciently set the "chain of events" in motion . 4 According to this analysis,
if the finder performs all services customarily required of finders in the
same industry, and if the transaction is consummated, the "procuring
cause" or "chain of events" requirement is a fortiori satisfied.3 5
Consolidated did not raise as error the trial court's determination
that the requirement of benefit and the requirement that the services
be rendered with a reasonable expectation of compensation were met."
Consequently, the Supreme Court's opinion does not specifically discuss
3 7
these two elements, except to say generally that they were satisfied.
The court closed with the following statement which appears to
summarize the sole evidence needed to allow Roberts to recover his
finder's fee:
Clearly, no dispute existed as to the following facts: that Roberts

brought Consolidated the deal; furnished all requested financial and
engineering data; that a deal was made for a value in excess of that
found by the trial court as the minimum; that that Goodstein, after
being put in touch with defendant by Roberts, later dealt with the
defendant through Straus. 3 8

Roberts was awarded judgment in the amount of $30,000, based upon
evidence that the usual (customary) commissions on a sale (or merger)
up to $1,000,000 was 5%, although it might range from 3% to 15%
with a scaled reduction on sales over $1,000,000.8 9
III. ELEMENTS OF A FINDER'S CAUSE OF ACTION
Although the factual setting of a finder's activities vary considerably, two factors must be considered in determining whether a
finder is entitled to compensation: First, has the finder performed
the services that are required of him; and second, have the events occurred (over which the finder may or may not have any control) which
are conditions to his right to compensation ?" The services the finder
must perform and the other terms and conditions upon which a finder's
compensation may be dependent may be set forth in an agreement
between the finder and recipient of his services. If there is no agreement, the services to be performed by the finder and the other conditions
34

1d. at 158, 425 P.2d at 287.
3 The court did not discuss, but from its use of the "procuring cause" or "chain of events"
requirement presumably left open the possibility of intervening causes resulting in the
consummation of the transaction. Thus, while the finder might perform all that is
required of him by the custom of the industry, there might be a break in the chain of
events such as to deprive him of his compensation.
38 Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts, 162 Colo. 149, 152, 425 P.2d 282, 284 (1967).
3 1
7 d. at 157, 425 P.2d at 286.
38 Id. at 160-61, 425 P.2d at 288.
39
1d. at 156, 425 P.2d at 284.
40 One such condition evidenced by Consolidated is benefit. As will be discussed infra,
benefit may also require the consummation of the transaction as well as a connecting
link between the services rendered and the benefit bestowed.
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precedent to his compensation, if any, are implied in law or fact under
the legal theories of quantum meruit or implied contract. In either
case the issues remain the same.
A. Agreement
Obviously, the finder and the persons to whom he renders services
can agree upon the amount of, and conditions to, his compensation.
This agreement can be oral, written, or implied in fact. 41 The parties
may specifically define the services to be rendered by the finder, the
dollar or percentage amount of the finder's fee, and/or the conditions,
if any, to be attached to the payment of the fee. If such an agreement
is made, it will be controlling, and the court will not imply any con42
ditions or terms inconsistent with those expressed in the agreement.
Similarly, if the conditions in the agreement are not satisfied, no
recovery will be allowed, even though the finder has performed all
services required of him by the agreement. This situation is illustrated
by the case of Scott v. Huntzinger43 which involved a claim by a real
estate broker for a commission. The written agreement provided: "If
the deal with White results in our sale of the property as provided in
the agreement with him, then we will pay you a commission ....
The "agreement" referred to gave White an option to buy certain
property. White did not exercise the option but purchased the property
from the defendant after the option expired. The Colorado Supreme
Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a commission, stating,
"the right of a broker to recover a commission depends upon the particular terms of the broker's employment. ' 45 The agreement between
plaintiff and defendant provided that plaintiff's brokerage fee was
contingent on White purchasing the land under the option to buy. Since
the option was not utilized in buying the property, the broker was not
entitled to compensation, even though he had performed all services
required of him by the contract.
Similarly, as early as 1894 the New York court in Knauss v.
Gottfried Krueger Brewing Co. 46 said:
The record shows that there was evidence of the employment of the
plaintiff for the mere purpose of bringing the possible buyer and
41 Generally,

finders' contracts do not need to be in writing. However, where the subject
matter of the finder is within a statute of frauds and under the terms of a few statutes
relating to employment contracts, a finder's contract must be in writing. See Annot..
24 A.L.R.3d 1160, 1168-70 (1969). Otherwise, recovery is available on an implied
contract theory.
See generally Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 1160, 1176 (1969). See also cases collected and
discussed in Annot., Validity, Construction and Enforcement of Business Opportunities
or "Finder's Fee Contract," 24 A.L.R.3d 1160, 1168-70 (1969).
42
See A. CORBIN, supra note 30, §§ 95-102, 556.
4 148 Colo. 225, 365 P.2d 692 (1961).
4Id.
at 228, 365 P.2d at 693.
45 Id. at 229, 365 P.2d at 695.
40 142 N.Y. Reports 70, 36 N.E. 867 (1894).
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seller together, and with the understanding that, if a sale were to
result, the plaintiff was to have some compensation from the defendant for his services. The plaintiff testified that he was to have
nothing to do with fixing the price or the terms of the sale; the
principals were to do that part of the business; all he had to do was
to bring them together, and if, through their subsequent negotiations,
a sale should result, the plaintiff was to be entitled to some com47
pensation.
By agreement, if (1) the finder introduced the parties and (2) a sale

resulted, the finder was entitled to the agreed compensation.
However, if the agreement is silent as to any conditions (other
than the finder's services) to a finder's right of compensation, such
conditions may nevertheless exist. The custom of the industry may impose conditions, and custom is normally a part of every contract, unless
expressly excluded or unless inconsistent with the express terms of the
contract. 4 8 The custom of finders in any particular sector of business
may include conditions to his right to compensation. To the degree
conditions are asserted when the written contract is silent, the law of
quantum meruit and implied contract is applicable.
B. Quantum Meruit and Implied Contract
When there is no agreement as to the services to be performed or
the conditions precedent to compensation, recovery may be dependent
upon proof of a quantum meruit cause of action. The definitions of
the courts suggest that the finder has no duty or responsibility other
than revealing the opportunity, but the holdings often belie the definitions, and his right to compensation may well depend upon subsequent events.
The requirements for recovery by a finder in quantum meruit
were set out in Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts.49
[F]irst, that the broker or agent has rendered services, and is permitted
to do so in such a manner as to indicate that he expected to be paid
for these services; and second, that the services are beneficial to the
party sought to be made liable. 5 0
1. Services by the Finder

In most instances, the services that a finder must perform are
questions of fact. Consolidated held that in the absence of agreement,
the services that must be performed by a finder in order to be entitled
to compensation are defined by custom in the industry. 1 In Consolidated, for example, the sole effort required of a finder in the oil and
gas industry was "to present a property available for acquisition and
47

Id.

48

See A. CoRBiN, supra note 30, §§ 95-102, 556.

19 162 Colo. 149, 425 P.2d 282 (1967).
5old. at 157, 425 P.2d at 286.
51 Id.
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then procure any requested information needed to evaluate the property."5 2 It is implicit from the statement of facts that any duties created
by requests for information may be defined by the person to whom
the opportunity is revealed. And if a finder refuses to perform such
further tasks, he may not be entitled to a fee or may receive a reduced
fee.
While most finders are active in areas where there is considerable
finder activity and, concomitantly, a finder custom, there seems no
reason why a finder could not receive quantum meruit compensation
for merely introducing parties or revealing an opportunity - subject
to such conditions subsequent as may be imposed - if the finder were
involved in an area in which no custom existed. Indeed, in the absence
of a custom of the industry and in the absence of additional services
being requested, the judicial definitions of a finder suggest such a
conclusion, if the other conditions not related to the scope of the finder's
services are fulfilled. 3 Further, while the issue of the services required
of the finder in Consolidated was resolved as a finding of fact, other
courts appear to have held as a matter of law that a finder's services
may consist simply of revealing an opportunity. 4
Yet according to Consolidated, the finder must also expect to be
compensated for his services. With respect to this condition, it is
usually sufficient that the person sought to be charged knew, or reasonably should have known, that the services were being rendered with
the expectation of payment,5 5 even though the person sought to be
charged did not know that the party performing the services expected
compensation and did not actually intend to pay for the services.
This requirement presents a special problem in finder's fee cases;
for the typical quantum meruit case, the mere fact of performance of
services and benefit to the recipient carries with it an implication or
presumption that the services are rendered with the expectation of
compensation, i.e., people do not normally render services without
2

1d. at 158, 425 P.2d at 286.
53With respect to real estate brokers, the quantum meruit terms for recovery of compensation are well established, although these principles of law probably have their roots in
the custom of the real estate business.
54E.g., Lindeman v. Textron, Inc., 229 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1956); Crofoot v. Spivak, 113
Cal. App.2d 146, 248 P.2d 45 (1952); Seckendorff v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 234 App.
Div. 61, 254 N.Y.S. 250 (1931), rev'd on other grounds, 250 N.Y. 353, 182 N.E. 14
(1932). But see Towers v. Doroshaw, 5 Misc. 2d 241, 159 N.Y.S.2d 367 (Sup. Ct.
1957). A more complete discussion of the measure of recovery follows in a later section,
but it should be noted here that the quantum of services has not to date been a significant
factor in this decision.
55
E.g., Nagele v. Miller, 73 Ida. 441, 253 P.2d 233 (1953); Johnson v. Nasi, 50 Wash.
2d 87, 309 P.2d 380 (1957); see City Ice & Fuel Co. v. Bright, 73 F.2d 461 (6th Cir.
1934); Spencer v. Spencer, 181 Mass. 471, 63 N.E. 947 (1902); Poppa v. Poppa, 364
S.W.2d 52 (Mo. App. 1962); Kellogg v. Gleeson, 27 Wash. 2d 501, 178 P.2d 969
(1947); cf. Mills v. Sharpe, 129 Colo. 589, 272 P.2d 641 (1954); Millard v. Loser,
52 Colo. 205, 121 P. 156 (1912). But cf. Towers v. Doroshaw, 5 Misc. 2d 241, 159
N.Y.S.2d 367, 375-76 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
5
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expecting compensation therefor.56 However, the relationship of the
parties may change this presumption.
For example, it is often held that where a family relationship
exists between the performer and recipient, there is a presumption that
compensation was not intended, the services being presumed to have
been rendered gratuituously.5 7 Perhaps such a presumption should be
applicable to a finder's fee claim based upon quantum meruit, when
the finder is claiming the fee from a business associate with whom he
regularly or frequently deals on other types of business, or when the
opportunity is volunteered without mention of, or agreement for, compensation. This presumption would be based upon a conclusion that
many opportunities are revealed in the business world by business
associates without any expectation of compensation for revealing such
opportunity. In fact, the difficulties inherent in the claim for compensation by one who freely broadcasts or volunteers his knowledge
of an opportunity and the multiple sources from which a person might
learn of opportunities suggest the desirability of requiring that such
agreements be in writing.
In any event, the relationship between the finder and the beneficiary may be determinative of the service requirement to a finder's
5
quantum meruit case. 8
2. Benefit to the Recipient
Often, however, the principal issue in a finder's claim for compensation is what constitutes benefit so as to entitle the finder to
compensation. Knowledge of an opportunity, as knowledge of anything,
may be benefit per se. If so, revealing an opportunity would satisfy
the benefit requirement without more. Thus, the finder's services may
consist only of revealing the opportunity, the definition of a finder's
services and the benefit that must be received by the recipient being
the same.
56 E.g., Dieterle v. Gatton, 366 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1966), appealed after remand, 397 F.2d

155 (6th Cir. 1968); Ferber Co. v. Ondrick, 310 F.2d 462 (1st Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 911 (1963); Meredith v. Marks, 27 Cal. Rptr. 737, 212 Cal. App.2d 265
(1963); Leoni v. Delaney, 83 Cal. App. 2d 303, 188 P.2d 765 (1948); Dixie Builders,
Inc. v. Partin, 54 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1951); Maui Aggregates, Inc. v. Reeder, 446 P.2d
174 (Hawaii 1968); Shurrum v. Watts, 80 Ida. 44, 324 P.2d 380 (1958); In re Winan's
Estate, 77 Ill. App. 2d 462, 222 N.E.2d 546 (1966).
57 In re Moyer, 190 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Va. 1960); Russell v. Baumann, 239 Ark. 830,
394 S.W.2d 619 (1965); Wilson v. Equitable Sec. Trust Co., 52 Del. 353, 158 A.2d
281 (1960); Tanner v. Tanner, 106 Ga. App. 270, 126 S.E.2d 838 (1962); Morris v.
Bruce, 98 Ga. App. 821, 107 S.E.2d 262 (1952); Shurrum v. Watts, 80 Ida. 44, 324
P.2d 380 (1958); Ferris v. Barrett, 250 Iowa 646, 95 N.W.2d 527 (1959); McDaniel
v. McDaniel, 305 S.W.2d 461 (Mo. 1957); Doby v. Williams, 53 N.J. Super. 548, 148
A.2d 42 (1959); Porter v. Ferguson, 53 Wash. 2d 693, 336 P.2d 133 (1959).
58Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts, 162 Colo. 149, 156-57, 425 P.2d 282, 286
(1967). Consolidated said that the finder must not only provide services but his relationship with the principal must be such as to justify a reasonable expectation of compensation on the part of the finder.
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Yet the services and the benefit are not the same; for while knowledge is desirable, it is beneficial in a legal sense only when used by the
recipient. Utilization of the information seems to be a condition precedent to a finder's compensation or a necessary part of the "benefit"
requirement, even though his services may be completed when he
reveals the opportunity. Hence, in any discussion of benefit, two other
factors must be considered: the need for a connecting link between
the services and the benefit, and the necessity for a consummated
transaction.
a. Chain of Events or Procuring Cause
Obviously, there must be some connection between the finder's
services and the benefit to the recipient of the services for recovery of
a finder's fee on the theory of quantum meruit. Consolidateddescribed
this connection as a "chain of events" or the services as being the
"procuring cause" 5 of the benefit and held that if the finder performed
all that was required of him by custom or request and if the benefit
was realized, the connection requirement was fulfilled.
Often, however, there can be such interruptions and intervening
causes such as to deny the finder his fee. The issue and the approach
to the resolution of the question of link or connection between the
finder's services and the benefit obtained cannot be more precisely
phrased than it was in Consolidated. When such circumstances arise,
the issue can normally be resolved by the same principles as are applied
by the courts in analogous situations involving brokers. 6 °
b. Consummated Transaction
Perhaps the most critical facet of the benefit requirement - and
perhaps a separate requirement in itself - is the need for a consummated transaction. Indeed, the author's research has disclosed no case
in which a finder has recovered compensation if the opportunity revealed by the finder was not exploited. While the parties may contractually provide for a finder's fee regardless of the use made of
r9Id. at 157-58, 425 P.2d at 286: The law of brokers requires the broker to be the procuring
cause of the sale. This procuring cause has been defined as the "effective cause" or the
"predominating effective cause"; see, e.g., Hayutin v. DeAndrea, 139 Colo. 40, 45, 337
P.2d 383, 385 (1959). See also Pass v. Industrial Asphalt of Calif., Inc., 239 Cal. App.
2d 776, 49 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1966): " 'Procuring cause' has been defined as the cause
originating a series of events that, without break in their continuity, result in the accomplishment of the prime object of the employment." Id. 49 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
60In the real estate industry, if more than one broker is employed, the broker who is the
first to present a ready, willing, and able party is entitled to the commission. See Pueblo
v. Leach Realty Co., 149 Colo. 92, 368 P.2d 195 (1962). Of course, such rule should be
subject to a finding of an uninterrupted chain of events. It is generally held that the
broker is entitled to his commission if his client is the cause of the failure of the sale
to be consummated. See, e.g., Circle T. Corp. v. Crocker, 155 Colo. 263, 393 P.2d 744
(1964); Pueblo v. Leach Realty Co., 149 Colo. 92, 368 P.2d 195 (1962).
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the information disclosed by the finder,6 1 in the absence of such a
contractual provision the exploitation of the opportunity by the recipient
of the finder's information should be held to be a condition subsequent,
implied by law or implied in fact to the right of a finder to compensation,6" whether the action is ex contractu or quantum meruit.63
The importance of whether the consummation of the transaction
is a condition to a finder's right to compensation lies in the mode of
operation of a finder. Whereas a broker usually is specifically employed
by a party for the purpose of a particular transaction, a finder often
is employed by no one. The finder often simply approaches persons
whom he feels may be interested in the opportunities of which the
finder has knowledge. Often the finder is not revealing a specific
proposal; he is revealing a very general concept of an opportunity. The
transformation of this opportunity into a transaction may occur long
thereafter, and the finder may have nothing to do with the transformation. Hence, a problem then arises, because the finder will often fail to
state the terms of compensation prior to revealing the opportunity,
and the "ready, willing and able" concept applicable to a broker's right
to compensation can rarely be applied to a finder. In most instances,
the finder's compensation must be tied to actual exploitation of the
opportunity, without an exception for the failure of the exploitation
due to the refusal or neglect of the party to whom the finder disclosed
the opportunity.
The conclusion that utilization of the finder's information is
normally a condition to a finder's right to compensation was reached
by the New York court in Towers v. Doroshaw," wherein plaintiff
sought a finder's fee for merely telling the defendant of a merger
opportunity which was never consummated.
[T]he Court does not consider the question .. . whether, upon satis-

factory proof of the promise so made, a party might be held liable
to pay for the mere mention to him of a corporation or firm with
which he might subsequently do business .... In no case cited by
With respect to real estate agents, COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117-2-1 (1963) provides
that no such agent shall be entitled to a commission for finding a purchaser "until the
same is consummated or is defeated by the refusal or neglect of the owner to consummate
the same as agreed on." No doubt this provision merely reflects prior case law. Query.
could the parties make a contract contrary to the terms of CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 117-2-1 (1963)?
62An argument for finding the condition to be implied may be based on two theories:
First, that there is an established custom in particular industries which would give the
principal notice of the finder's expectation upon consummation; second, that common
sense compels the conclusion that the consummated transaction is the benefit for which
the principal must compensate the finder, the absence of which estoppes the finder from
claiming compensation. See Towers v. Doroshaw, supra note 54.
63COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117-2-1 (1963) provides:
No real estate agent or broker shall be entitled to a commission for finding a
purchaser who is ready, willing and able to complete the purchase of the real
estate as proposed by the owner, until the same is consummated or is defeated
by the refusal or neglect of the owner to consummate the same as agreed upon.
645 Misc. 2d 241, 159 N.Y.S. 2d 367 (App. Div. 1957).
61
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the plaintiff has there been enforced an obligation to pay compensation to a "finder" for the disclosure of the name alone, without an
introduction or negotiations leading to an eventual transaction between
the defendant and the buyer. Certainly, when such an agreement is not
reduced to writing, the plaintiff must sustain his burden of establishing
the contract by evidence of a quality and quantity sufficient to satisfy
the court of a clear and unequivocal intention by the defendant to
pay for the mere disclosure. 65
In holding that the plaintiff could not recover in quantum meruit if

the transaction proposed was not consummated, the court said: "A
broker is never entitled to commissions for unsuccessful efforts. The
risk of failure is wholly his. The reward comes only with his success. '"66

While generally the custom of the industry in which the finder operated
would be the basis of the holding and the consummation of the transaction would be a condition subsequent implied in fact, " the result in
Towers appears to be a conclusion of law, i.e., a separate condition
implied by law into the contract or into the quantum meruit
relationship.68
Even in the absence of custom, the consummated transaction condition should be implied in law, unless there is evidence of circumstances
showing an intention (or justification) of the parties that the finder
would be paid for merely revealing the opportunity regardless of what
transpired thereafter. Such constructive conditions, as defined by Corbin,
are founded on grounds of justice, independent of expressed intention
or consideration. 69 With respect to finders, it seems difficult to concede
that the parties would have intended the finder to be compensated
regardless of the outcome of the transaction if they had considered it,7"
since the sole purpose of the relationship between the finder and
exploiter is to consummate the proposed transaction.
5Id.
at 249, 159 N.Y.S. 2d at 376.
6Id. at 252, 159 N.Y.S. 2d at 379, quoting Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N.Y. 378,
383 (1881).
67 "In truth, usage is one of the agencies by which the law has been gradually formed and
still is not only added to, but otherwise amended." That usage may harden by repeated
decisions into such new rules of law as do not contradict any previously existing rule is,
however, clearly stated. S. WILLISTON, CONTRAcTs § 655 (3d ed. 1961). Perhaps the
custom of consummation of the transaction as a condition to compensation has already
become a part of the common law of finders' fees.
68Perhaps this conclusion is merely the result of sound logic and common sense. It seems
highly unlikely that compensation to the finder would be agreed upon regardless of
whether the information resulted in actual benefit to the obligor. However, the benefit
should be defined in terms of exploitation of the opportunity rather than the amount
of profits realized therefrom, although the latter fact may be highly important to the
question of amount of compensation.
6
9See generally A. CORBIN, CONTRACrs §§ 631-32, 653-55 (1960).
"One might approach the issue by way of the commercial frustration doctrine. See
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 288 (1932). Ordinarily, both parties would assume the
opportunity would be exploited, and if the promisor is unable to exploit the opportunity
through no fault of his own, the objective has been frustrated. However, most often the
failure of the exploitation is because of an inability to agree upon terms.
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In rationalizing such an approach, some courts have implied the
condition that the transaction be consummated by applying the principle
that one must accomplish what he undertook to do in order to recover
compensation for his services. 71 Applying this rule, a finder does not
merely undertake to reveal an opportunity; he undertakes to obtain
an advantageous transaction for another. Unless the opportunity revealed by the finder is exploited, the party to whom the opportunity
is revealed has not obtained an advantageous transaction. While this
approach results in the proper conclusion and while no doubt both
parties to a finder's arrangement anticipate that it will culminate in
an advantageous transaction, it is not precise to say the finder undertook to accomplish the advantageous transaction. At most, the finder
undertook to present an advantageous transaction and, perhaps, to do
what he could to assist the parties in consummating the transaction.
The consummating of the transaction is ordinarily left to the parties
involved.
Another way in which the consummated transaction is made into
an implied condition is based on the "procuring cause" requirement, i.e.,
the finder must have procured a consummated transaction or he is not
entitled to compensation. The same conclusion can be reached in a
quantum meruit case by a holding that no benefit has been received
unless the recipient of the finder's disclosure utilizes the information
to his benefit.
While the requirement of a consummated transaction can be
based on several theories, perhaps it can best be explained by the
doctrine of commercial frustration. Under this doctrine, it is held that
[w]here the assumed possibility of a desired object or effect to be
attained by either party to a contract forms the basis on which both

parties enter into it, and this object or effect is or surely will be
frustrated, a promisor who is without fault in causing the frustration,
and who is harmed thereby, is discharged from the duty of performing
72
his promise unless a contrary intention appears.

Thus, in the circumstances of a finder, exploitation of the opportunity or information is normally a desired object or effect which forms
the basis of an agreement or quantum meruit relation upon which a
finder's fee is asserted. This assumption is obviously logical, and unless
the finder can prove a "clear and unequivocal intention by the defenHere, the difference between a broker and a finder may be most apparent. At the time
a real estate broker, for example, comes on the scene, the deal that his principal wants is
normally defined in specific terms. In the business of the finder, e.g., corporate mergers,
there is often only a vague concept of the terms upon which the "deal" could be
consummated because of the sundry alternatives that can be followed to consummate a
merger.
2
RESTATEMENT OF CONrRACTS § 288 (1933). See also A. CORBIN, CONTRACrS §§ 135161 (1962).
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dant to pay for the mere discloser, ' 7 8 the finder's right to a fee should
be held to be conditioned upon exploitation of the disclosure.
IV.

DETERMINATION OF THE FEE

A. Agreement
If the parties have agreed upon the amount of the finder's fee,
74

this is ordinarily conclusive.

B. Quantum Meruit
Under the theory of quantum meruit, "reasonable compensation"
is recoverable. Obviously, many factors are relevant to the determination
of reasonable compensation. Therefore, no attempt will be made here
to define the scope of evidence admissible on the issue of reasonable
compensation, 73 except to point out that generally the type of evidence
necessary to establish the amount of any quantum meruit claim should
also be relevant to a finder's fee quantum meruit claim. Thus, the time
spent by the finder, the skill of the finder, and the value of the subject
Although the usual evidence of reasonable compensation in a
quantum meruit cause of action is relevant, it rarely provides much
guidance to the determination of a reasonable finder's fee. The time
spent and scope of services provided by the finder may provide some
guidance, but it is difficult for such factors to be persuasive, since a
finder is usually paid on a commission basis. Indeed, a finder's compensation, not unlike a lawyer's contingent fee, must compensate him
somewhat for the failures for which he received no compensation as
matter are all relevant to the determination of the value of the services.
well as for his successes. Of course, if the fee is claimed, even though
the opportunity was never exploited, consideration of factors such as
time involved would be appropriate.
In either case, proof of customary finders' fees will normally be
the mode of proving a reasonable fee. Evidence of fees customarily
received for similar services is admissible to show the reasonable value
of services rendered by the finder. 76 The admissibility of evidence of
customary fees is based on the presumption that a fee would not attain
78 Thus, in the circumstances of a finder, exploitation of the opportunity of information

is normally the desired object or effect which forms the basis of an agreement or
quantum meruit relation upon which a finder's fee is asserted. This assumption is
obviously logical, and unless the finder can prove a "clear and unequivocal intention by
the defendant to pay for the mere disclosure," the finder's right to a fee should be held
to be conditioned upon exploitation of the disclosure.
74 When finder's fees are negotiated, relevant factors include the dollar size of the opportunity, the anticipated profit, and the scope of the services to be performed by the finder.
However, often the agreed upon fee is merely a recognition of the finder's fee that is
customary in the particular industry.
75

See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES § 46 (1935); A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS

§§ 1004, 1112 (1964).
7

6Geiger v. Kiser, 47 Colo. 297, 305, 107 P. 267, 270 (1910).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 47

the stature of custom if it were not reasonable. Evidence of customary
fees is also admissible on the ground that custom is incorporated by
law into every contractual or quantum meruit relationship. In Fleming
v. Wells,7" a case wherein the plaintiff sought to recover reasonable
compensation for real estate broker services, the court said:
The right of one rendering service for another to have their
value estimated under a quantum meruit upon a basis of commissions
can only arise out of a general custom, so that where such custom
exists in reference to certain kinds of business, anyone actually or
presumptively having knowledge of it, and employing the persons
engaged in such business to perform services in their line without
special contract, will be presumed to have done so with reference to
such custom .... 78

However, sometimes both of the parties will not be a part of the
industry whose customary fees are sought to be used as evidence, and
this is particularly true with respect to finders. The rule in this circumstance is that customary charges are evidence of reasonableness but
are in no way conclusive.7"
CONCLUSION

By reason of the informal manner in which most "finder" business
is conducted, the scope of services to be performed by the finder and
the terms upon which he is to be paid will usually not be expressed.
Evidence of custom of the industry may be used to fill some of these
gaps. However, often because of the difficulty of obtaining testimony
of an industry's custom, or due to the absence of a custom in the
industry, the gaps in a finder's arrangement cannot be filled in this
manner. In such a situation, the courts should not hesitate to fill the
gaps by applying logic and making their own determinations as to
what the parties would have reasonably contemplated had they in fact
considered these issues. Ultimately, as in the case of real estate brokers,
many of the arrangements will be defined by law as a matter of law.

77 45 Colo. 255, 101 P. 66 (1909).

at 259, 101 P. at 67; cf. Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts, 162 Colo. 149,
425 P.2d 282 (1967).
79Fleming v. Wells, 45 Colo. 255, 101 P. 66 (1909): "In an action for reasonable
compensation by one employed to sell real estate and who effects the sale, but who is
not regularly engaged in that business, evidence of the customary charges of real estate
agents for such services is relevant, but such customary charges are not conclusive at
fixing the compensation of the persons making such sale and such circumstances." Id. at
259, 101 P. at 67. See also 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers § 161 (1964); Morehouse v.
Shepard, 183 Mich. 472, 150 N.W. 112 (1914).
7Id.

